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GAS ROYALTY PROVISIONS AND THE RIGHTS
OF LESSORS AND LESSEES WITH RESPECT
TO SALE OF GAS
EARL A. BROWN, JR.*
T IS MY FEELING that some of you may have the idea that
this subject is interesting only from an academic standpoint.
To the contrary, it is my opinion that the construction of the gas
royalty provisions in oil and gas leases, and the rights of lessors
and lessees with respect to the sale of gas thereunder, will afford
some of the most practical problems that an oil and gas lawyer in
this northwestern area will consider in the next twenty years. It is
true that we have not yet discovered any great gas reserves in
this area, but this development is inevitable with the passage of
time, and any careful lawyer should have a knowledge of the
meaning and net effect of the gas royalty provisions contained
in an oil and gas lease to which his client is a party - considera-
tions which are not now fully appreciated or understood by too
many of the oil and gas lawyers in this country.
There are certain basic differences between the usual oil and
gas lease clause providing for oil royalties and the lease provisions
prescribing the manner of payment of royalties on the production
of gas. The customary oil royalty clause reads substantially as
follows:
"On oil and other liquid hydrocarbons saved at the well,
one-eighth of that produced and saved from said land, same
to be delivered free of cost at the wells or to the credit of
lessor in the pipe line to which the wells may be connected."
Subject to certain changes in phraseology, the customary gas
royalty provisions of a lease read:
"On gas including casinghead gas and all gaseous
substances, produced from said land and sold or used off the
premises or in the manufacture of gasoline or other products
therefrom, the market value at the mouth of the well of one-
eighth of the gas so sold or used, provided that on gas sold at the
wells the royalty shall be one-eighth of the amount realized
from such sale; and (c) if at any time while there is a gas well
or wells on the above land (and for the purposes of this clause
(c) the term 'gas well' shall include wells capable of produc-
ing natural gas, condensate, distillate or any gaseous substance
and wells classified as gas wells by any governmental authority)
0 Mr. Brown is a member of the firm of Vinson, Elkins and Wetms, IHouston, Texas.
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such well or wells are shut in, and if this lease is not continued
in force by some other provision hereof, then it shall neverthe-
less continue in force for a period of ninety (90) days from the
date such well or wells are shut in, and before the expiration of
any such ninety-day (90-day) period, lessee or any assignee
hereunder may pay or tender an advance annual royalty equal
to the amount of delay rentals provided for in this lease for the
acreage then held under this lease by the party making such
payment or tender, and if such payment or tender is made, this
lease shall continue in force and it shall be considered that gas is
being produced from the leased premises in paying quantities
within the meaning of paragraph 2 hereof for one (1) year
from the date such well or wells are shut in, and in like man-
ner subsequent advance annual royalty payments may be made
or tendered and this lease shall continue in force and it will
be considered that gas is being produced from the leased
premises in paying quantities within the meaning of said para-
graph 2 during any annual period for which such royalty is so
paid or tendered;**"
Under the above quoted oil royalty clause, the payment of
such royalty to the lessor is provided to be in kind, that is, by
delivery to the lessor or his credit of 1/8th of the oil produced
and saved from the leased land, and, therefore, the lessor is said to
have reserved a vested royalty interest in the oil which is ex-
cepted from the grant.'
However, under the above quoted gas royalty clause, the full
8/8ths interest in the gas produced under the lease vests in the
lessee, and the royalty interest of the lessor is payable only in
money.-
In Tidewater Associated Oil Company v. Clemens,:! the court
said:
"Appellee concedes that by the grant in the lease ownership
and title to all the gas produced from the land passed to apel-
lant. Stephens County v. Mid-Kansas Oil & Gas Co., 113 Tex.
160, 254 S.W. 290, 29 A.L.R. 566. Appellee further concedes
that appelant's agreement to pay the rentals stipulated in the
royalty provisions of the lease is a personal obligation on the
part of appellant, a promise to pay a specific price for a thing-
1. A leading case, cited numerous times with approval by the State and Federal
courts, is Hager v. States, 116 Tex. 453, 294 S.W. 835. See also Sneed, Value of Leessor's
Share of Production Where Gas Only Is Produced, 25 Tex. Law Rev. 641 (1947).
2. Humble Oil and Refining Co. v. Poe, 29 S.W.2d 1019 (Tex. Comm. App., 1930);
Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Stroud, 3 S.'.2d 465 (T.C.A., 1927, err. Dism.); Wall v.
United Gas Public Service Co., 178 La. 908, 152 So. 561 (1934); Sneed, supra note 1,
at 641. and numerous other authorities. See also Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Connellee
11 S.W.2d 158 (Tex. Comm. App. 1928) wherein the court held that under an
oil and gas lease, which expressly provided for the payment of a fixed sum per gas
well per year, all of the casinghead gas or dry gas produced under the lease was conveyed
to and became the property of the leassee.
3. 123 S.\%.2d 780 (T. C. A., 1938).
GAS ROYALTY PROVISIONS
gas-already conveyed to and owned by appellant. Reynolds v.
McMan Oil & Gas Co., Tex. Com. App., 11 S.W. 2d 778. And
it is not disputed but that appellant's ownership of all the gas
comprehends ownership of every constituent element thereof
and that he had the right to sell the same or any part thereof,
charged only with appellee's right to demand and appellant's
corresponding obligation to pay the agreed rental on the gas
sold which in this is the '1/8th of the market price at the wells
of the amount sold.' Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Connellee,
Tex. Com. App., 11 S.W. 2d 158."
At this point, it should be noted that a majority of my references
and authorities come from Texas sources, but the rules and prin-
ciples of law stated therein are general rules of construction and
should receive universal application. In connection therewith, I
have made a diligent search and have been unable to find any
authorities announced by the courts in this area to the contrary.
We have heretofore indicated the customary gas royalty clause
contained in perhaps a majority of the lease forms now being
used in the area. Naturally, there are variations in the wording of
this clause as reflected in a number of the current lease forms,4
but regardless of the phraseology, the same standards of "market
price", "market value at the mouth of the well", "amount realized
from the sale thereof", and "proceeds from the sale thereof" ap-
4. Several typical gas royalty provisions in oil and gas leases are:(1) "On gas (including casinghead gas and other vapors) produced from said
land and sold or used off the leased premises or in the manufacture of gasoline or other
products, the current market price at the wells of one-eighth (%) of the gas so sold
or used."
(2) "Lessee shall pay lessor, as royalty, one-eighth of the proceeds from the sale
of the gas, as such, for gas from wells where gas only is found, and where not sold
shall pay Fifty Dollars ($50.00) per annum "as royalty from each such well, and while
such royalty is so paid such well shall be held to be a producing well under paragraph
two hereof. The lessor shall have gas free of charge from any gas well on the leased
premises for stoves and inside lights ii the principal dwelling house on said land by
making his own connections with the well, the use of said gas to be at lessor's sole risk
and expense. Lessee shall pay to lessor for gas produced. from any oil well and used by
lessee for the manufacture of gasoline, or any other product, as royalty, one-eighth (/)
of tle market value of such gas. If said gas is sold by lessee, then, as royalty, one-eighth
of the proceeds of the sale thereof."
(3) "To pay lessor one-eighth (%) of the market value at the well for gas from
each well where gas only is found and used off the premises, and lessor to have gas
free of cost from any such well for all stoves and all inside lights in the principal dwelling
house on such land during the same time by making his own connections with the well
at his own risk and expense.
"To pay lessor one-eighth (%) of the market value at the well for gas produced
from any oil well and used off the premises, or for the manufacture of casinghead gasoline
or dry commercial gas."
(4) "To pay the lessor one-eighth, at the market price at the well for the gas so
used. for the gas from each well where gas only is found, while the same is being
used off the premises, and lessor to have gas free of cost from any such well for all stoves
and all inside lights in the principal dwelling house on said land during the same time
by making his own connections with the wells as his own risk and expense.
"To pay lessor for gas produced from any oil well and used off the premises or for
the manufacture of casinghead gasoline, one-eighth, at the market price at the well for
the gas so used, for the time during which such gas shall be used, said payments to
be made monthly."
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pear in some form in nearly all leases as the criteria for the deter-
mination of the royalty to be paid the lessor, and under any of these
standards, a computation by the lessee is required in order to
translate actual gas production figures into money payments. It is
therefore important both to the lessor and the lessee that the
mechanics and factors affecting this computation be understood
when the lease is executed and accepted by them.
Due to its nature and make-up, the gas industry presents a prob-
lem even more complex than does the oil industry. As has been
pointed out, "this additional complexity is, of course, due to the
physical properties of the gas itself. Because gas is incapable of
being stored in large quantities, its utilization must always equal
production, excepting wastage. Places of utilization can be reach-
ed only by means of expensive pipe lines, thus limiting stringently
the free exchange of the commodity.-- Gas of a given quality now
being utilized for the manufacture of carbon black cannot effec-
tively compete with gas of the same quality being used for light
and fuel purposes. Since the consumers for light and fuel pur-
poses pay more per cubic foot for their gas than do consumers
for carbon black purposes, the value of a given quantity of gas
at a given point is determined by the use made of the gas, and one
quantity of gas need not have the same value unless they are
similarly utilized. This value differential cannot be equalized by
the law of supply and demand forcing a surplus of gas into the
consumer market paying the most for the gas. Manifestly, such
equalization is physically and economically impossible. An ap-
preciation of these physical and economic factors is essential to a
proper understanding of the problems recently before the courts."'
It thus appears that such general standards as market price
and market value, as hereinbefore referred to, are required for
the determination of the amount of royalties to be paid on gas
production under varying and sometimes unforeseen situations.
Experience has proven that it is not practicable to fix a price on
which to base the payment of these gas royalties. During the de-
velopment of the Carthage Gas Field in East Texas approxi-
mately ten years ago, one gas royalty clause then currently in use
provided for the payment of the royalty owner's share of the gas
at the rate of 30 per thousand cubic feet.7 With the construction
5. Sneed, Value of Lessor's Share of Production Where Gas Only Is Produced, 25
Tex. Law Rev. 641 n. 7 (1947).
6. Sneed, supra at pages 641 and 642.
7. One such clause read: "To pay Lessor for all gas (whether casinghead or other-
wise) produced from said land and sold or utilized off the premises or used in the
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following the close of World War II of the trans-continental pipe
lines carrying gas to distant consumer markets, an increased de-
mand for gas was created which naturally resulted in raising the
price paid for gas in the Carthage Field, and as a result, it was
not uncommon for a landowner to receive the payment of gas
royalties from one company calculated on the basis of 30 per
thousand cubic feet, and at the same time to receive a gas royalty
from another company under a market value lease calculated
on the basis of the prevailing market price of 50 per thousand
cubic feet." In addition, the gas royalty computed on the 30 basis
was in some cases further reduced by the unfavorable provisions
of the lease, from the lessor's standpoint, as to the pressure and
temperature at which the gas was to be measured. It should be
remembered that Boyle's Law may vitally affect the amount of the
royalty paid to a lessor whenever the lease terms provide for the
measurement of the gas upon a given pressure and temperature
basis.'
It therefore appears that a more flexible standard for the deter-
mination of the payment of gas royalties is desirable, and it is
perhaps for this reason that the more general terms of "market
value" and "market price" have been included in the gas royalty
clauses hereinbefore mentioned. However, general as these terms
may be, they are susceptible of definition and construction de-
pending upon applicable production, marketing and other con-
ditions. Mr. George Siefikin, speaking before the Fourth Annual
Oil and Gas Institute at the Southwestern Legal Foundation, has
summarized certain evidentiary rules with respect to the meaning
of these terms as follows:10
"(1) 'Market price' and 'market value' of gas (or oil) at
the well mean the price for which gas of the same quality is be-
ing sold under similar conditions and for comparable utilization
purposes in the field, or, undoubtedly, in analogous fields."
"(2) If the gas has a market value in the field for one pur-
pose, but not for another-as where purchasers for gasoline ex-
manufacture of gasoline or other product therefrom, %th of the value of such gas at the
mouth of the well in its natural state (including gasoline, whether same lie recovered by
drips or through absorbtion plant or by any other process) calculated at the rate of three
(3c) cents per 1,000 cubic feet, corrected to 2 lbs. above assumed atmospheric pressure
of fourteen and seven tenths (14.7 lbs.) pounds per square inch."
8. This condition was only resolved when the operating companies voluntarily entered
into amendments of existing leases which contained the fixed price of 3c, so as to
provide for an increased royalty on gas production thereunder.
9. In this connection, Texas has recently enacted a gas measurement statute. Article
6066b, 52, Vernon's Revised Civil Statutes of Texas.
10. Siefidn, Rights of Lessor and Lessee With Respect To Sale Of Gas and As To
Gas Royalty Provisions, Fourth Annual Institute on Oil and Ga. Lato and Taxation,
Southwestern Legal Foundation, page 181, 185-187.
11. Sieflkin, Id., n. 12.
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traction are available, but no sales can be made to pipe lines
for fuel and light distribution-the market value for the sale-
able use controls (even though the purchaser may in fact de-
vote it to a different use).'
"(3) In the absence of well head sales in the field (which
is the common situation), market price at the well is estab-
lished by proving market price paid elsewhere in the field, less
the cost of transporation to the available market.,:'
"(4) What pipe line purchasers pay for gas under long
term 'dedication' contracts, involving numerous considerations
not present in well head sales to, say, gasoline extractors, is ir-
relevant and inadmissible to prove market vaule at the well.'-
However, if expert testimony is adduced which appraises these
collateral 'considerations' and which, accordingly, arrives at a
well head evaluation, then evidence of pipe line purchase
prices-as analyzed by the expert witnesses-is competent.'"
"(5) If, but only if, the lessor first clearly establishes the
absence of 'market value' he may then attempt to prove
'intrinsic' (or 'real', 'actual', or 'reasonable') value of his gas
at the well, by any and all available means, and insist that
his royalties be computed on that basis.'
While it appears that "market value" and "market price" have
substantially the same meaning as will be hereinafter mentioned,
there is a difference of opinion as to whether there is a distinction
to be drawn between such terms and "proceeds" or "net proceeds".
Mr. Sneed believes that the term "proceeds" means something dif-
ferent from "market price" or "market value",'" while Mr. Siefkin
has taken the position that for all practical effect, the terms "mar-
ket price", "market value" and "proceeds" result in the applica-
tion of the same standard, that is, under any standard, the royalty
is predicated on the market value at the well head, irrespective
of the price of sale." It is true that there does not appear to be
any real distinction between "market value" and "market price"
12. Siefkin, Id., n. 13.
13. Siefkin, Id., n. 14.
14. Siefkin, Id., n. 15.
15. Siefkin, Id., n. 16.
16. Siefkin, Id., n. 17.
17. Sneed, supra note 5, at "655, citing Adams v. Petroleum Co., 205 Cal. 221,
270 Pac. 668 (1928), but calling attention to O'Neal v. Union Producing Co., 153 F.2d
157 (5th Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 715 (1946), where the royalty was "one-eighth
part of net proceeds at prevailing market price at well" and the court held that the
market price was the proper standard.
18. Siefkin, supra note 10, at 214, citing E. G. Kretni Development Co. v. Consolidated
Oil Corporation, 74 F.2d 497 (10th Cir. 1934) ("proceeds"); Phillips Petroleum Co. v.
Ochsner, 146 F.2d 138 (5th Cir. 1944) ("gross proceeds"); Warfield Natural Gas Co.
v. Allen, 261 Ky. 840, 88 S.W.2d 989, 991 (1935) ("gross proceeds" held to mean
market value at the well); cf. O'Neal v. Union Producing Co., 57 F. Supp. 440
(W.D.La. 1944), affirmed 153 F.2d 157 (5th Cir. 1946) ("net proceeds"); Saulsbury
Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 142 F.2d 27 (10th Cir. 1944) ("net proceeds").
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with reference to a gas royalty clause,"' but it is possible that
under a given fact situation, a different result would be obtained
if the applicable standard was "proceeds" or "net proceeds".-)
This difference would likewise exist where the standard was the
"amount realized from such sale," and the amount of gas royalty
paid thereunder might well be more or less than that paid a lessor
on the basis of "market price" or "market value." It is suggested
that if the lessor-lessee intent is to allow the lessor, as royalty,
one-eighth of the proceeds from the sale of leased gas, the term
"amount realized from such sale" should be incorporated in the
lease. This standard is capable of definite ascertainment and will
render unnecessary the somtimes complicated process of deter-
mining "market value" or "proceeds." Regardless of what standard
is used, however, it appears to be well settled that the determination
of such standard is a question of fact,2 and whether sales of gas
in the field, or evidence of prices paid for gas by pipe line com-
panies, are admissible in evidence, as well as the weight to be given
such evidence even if admitted, seems dependent in part, from an
analysis of the reported decisions, upon the situation and equities
in the particular action.
No one will question the fact that the ordinary gas royalty clause
is general and somewhat ambiguous, but it is suggested, in view of
the nature and complexity of the gas industry and the innumerable
variables which affect the determination of the royalty to be paid on
gas production, that elasticity is desirable. Regardless of other
considerations, this clause is subject to being construed by the
parties, or by the courts if necessary, with regard to the intention
of the parties and the attending circumstances at the time of the
19. Arkansas Natural Gas Co. v. Sartor, 78 F.2d 924 (5th Cir. 1935); Phillips
Petroleum Co. v. Bynum, 155 F.2d 196 (5th Cir. 1946). These terms are defined in
Bouvier's Law Dictionary, page 758-"Market Price . . . it means the price at which
such articles are sold and purchased"; "Market Value. A price established by public
sales, or sales in the way of ordinary business." See also Sartor v. United Gas Public
Service Co., 84 F.2d 436 (5th Cir. 1936); Union Producing Co. v. Pardue, 117 F.2d
225 (5th Cir. 1941); Haynes v. Southwest Natural Gas Co., 123 F.2d 1011 (5th Cir.
1941); Sartor v. Arkansas Natural Gas Corp., 134 F.2d 433 (5th Cir. 1943). But cf.
Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Coffee, 140 F.2d 409 (5th Cir. 1944) where the court
held that market price is not necessarily the same as market value. This decision has
been criticized as being in conflict with the other decisions of the same court, supra, but
it is believed that it can be reconciled.,
20. Sneed, supra note 1, at 654. But see Siefkin, supra note 10, at 213 who, while
stating that the distinction is literally correct, takes an opposit, view, citing Phillips
Petroleum Co. v. Ochsner, 146 F.2d 138 (5th Cir. 1934) and Phillips I'trolcum Co. v.
Record, 146 F.2d 485 (5th Cir. 1944).
21. Sartor v. Arkansas Natural Gas Corp., 321 U.S. 620 (1943); Hemler v. Union
Producing Co., 134 F.2d 436 (5th Cir. 1943); Union Producing Co. v. Pardue, 117 F.2d
225 (5th Cir. 1941); Sneed, supra note 1, at 649.
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execution of the lease, and perhaps the concern of some writers
for the redrafting of this clause may not be warranted.: =
As we have seen, there is granted to the lessee under the usual
oil and gas lease the ownership and title to all of the gas produced
from the leased land,2:3 and the lessee has the right to sell such gas
without the joinder or consent of the lessor for such price and on
such conditions as the lessee may determine. Some may say that it
is not fair to deny the lessor the opportunity to participate in the
marketing of the gas, but actually this objection is seldom raised.
While it is true that a gas purchase contract providing for the sale of
gas does not always cover a large area, the fact that gas is ordi-
narily produced from gas production units usually results in a num-
ber of royalty owners participating in the payment of royalties
from production under one contract. If the consent of all of these
royalty owners was required before one gas purchase contract
could be consummated, it is entirely possible that a contract
would never be executed.
However, another problem is presented, in theory at least,
when a lessee executes a gas purchase contract whereby he
sells the gas produced under leases containing clauses similar to
those hereinbefore mentioned. Let us assume that the lessee exe-
cutes a gas purchase contract for a term of 25 years. The current
price then being paid for gas in the field is 30 per thousand cubic
feet, but because of the length of the contract commitment, *he
lessee obtains a contract price of 5¢ per thousand cubic feet. Thus
the royalty owner is initially benefited by receiving payment of his
royalty on the basis of a gas price higher than the market value
in the field, but this situation is reversed when five years later, the
market value in the field is 80 per thousand cubic feet. The lessor
is entitled to the market value of his gas royalty under the lease,
he is not a party to the gas purchase contract and is not bound
thereby, and the question is whether or not he is entitled to pay-
ment of the difference between the contract price and the market
value. It has been stated that when the gas purchase contract was ex-
cuted by the lessee in compliance with his obligation as a reasonable
prudent operator to market the gas produced under the lease, the
lessor could not legally complain of the economics resulting there-
from.24 Further, there is authority for the proposition that the
22. Sieflin, supra note 10, at 216; Sneed, supra note 1, at 656.
23. See authorities cited in note 2 supra.
24. Siefkin, supra note 10, at 188-191. Mr. Siefkin also indicates that the shoe fits
both ways and that by reason of the long term contract, the lessor is insured against a
price decline.
GAS ROYALTY PROVISIONS
lessor accepts the terms of the contract by executing a division
order with knowledge of the contract. :' While it is true that the
ordinary division order may be an agreement between the lessor
and the lessee as one party, and the pipe line purchaser of the
production as the other party, and is usually terminable at will by
the lessor,2r this situation can be resolved under any theory by
including in the division order an express provision whereby the
gas purchase contract is ratified.27
That part of the above quoted gas royalty clause providing for
the payment of shut-in gas royalties has already been discussed
by Professor Williams, and I will not further elaborate on the
problems arising with respect thereto. It appears that these pay-
ments are in the nature of royalty, as distinguished from the
delay rentals payable under an oil and gas lease, and the royalty
owner is entitled to receive same in lieu of the other gas royalties
provided in the lease.2"
The pooling clause in an oil and gas lease is not included as a
part of the royalty provisions, but it often materially affects the
respective rights of the lessor and lessee with respect to gas pro-
duction under or allocated to the lease. A typical clause of this
type' usually grants to the lessee the right to pool or unitize the
25. Union Producing Co. v. Driskell, 117 F.2d 229 (5th Cir. 1941); Indian Refining
Co. v. Kellar, 203 Ky. 720, 263 S.W. 9 (1924); Simpson v. United Gas Pipe Line Co.,
196 Miss. 356, 17 S.2d 200 (1944); Merrill, Covenants Implied In Oil and Gas Lease
§85 (2d ed. 1940).
26. Mills & Willingham, Law of Oil & Gas §136 (1926); 3 Summers, Oil and Gas
J590 (1938); Merrill, op. cit. supra note 25, 185 (1950 Supplement). These writers also
suggest that the execution of a division order by the lessor should not affect the obligations
of the lessee under the lease except as to matters of estoppel and the like created by the
division order. See also Stanolind Oil & Gas Co. v. Terrell, 183 S.W.2d 743 (Tex. C. A.
1944); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Williams, 158 F.2d 723 (5th Cir. 1947).
27. In Indian Refining Co. v. Kellar, 203 Ky. 720, 263 S.W. 9 (1924), the
lessor was held to be bound by the lessee's long term contract by reason of the execution
of a division order, which did not include an express ratification provision, apparently on
the ground of an estoppel in pais. This result seems logically correct.
28. Morriss v. First Nat. Bank of Mission, 249 S.W.2d 269 (Tex. C.A. 1952).
See also Walker, Clauses in Oil and Gas Leases Providing for the Payment of an annual
Sum As Royalty on a Non-Producing Gas Well, 24 Tex. Law Rev. 478 (1946).
29. Lessee is hereby granted the right to pool or unitize this lease, the land covered
by it or any part thereof with any other land, lease, leases, mineral estates or parts thereof
for the production of oil, gas or any other minerals. Units pooled for oil hereunder shall not
exceed forty (40) acres plus a tolerance of ten per cent (10%) thercof, and
units pooled for gas hereunder shall not exceed six hundred forty (640) acres plus a
tolerance of ten per cent (10% ) thereof, provided that if any Federal or State law,
Executive order, rule or regulation shall prescribe a spacing pattern for the development
of the field or allocate a producing allowable on acreage per well, then any such units
may embrace as much additional acreage as may be so prescribed or as may be used
in such allocation or allowable. Lessee shall file written unit designations in the county
in which the premises are located. Such units may be designated either before or after
the completion of wells. Drilling operations and production on any part of the pooled
acreage shall be treated as if such drilling operations were upon or such production
was from the land described in this lease whether the well or wells be located on the
land covered by this lease or not. The entire acreage pooled into a unit shall be treated
for all purposes, except the payment of royalties on production from the pooled unit,
as if it were included in this lease. In lieu of the royalties' herein provided, lessor shall
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leased lands with other lands so as to create production units
for gas of 640 acres, plus a tolerance of 10% thereof, and the
lessor is entitled to payment only of his proportionate part of
the royalty accruiiig from the unit production. In addition, after
the lessee has filed a written unit designation in accordance with
the lease, the entire area is treated for operational purposes
as one lease, and drilling operations and production on any
part of the unit area is deemed to be operations or pro-
duction on the land described in each of the oil and gas
leases pooled and included in the unit. Thus it is possible for a
lessee to pool only a part of the land covered by his lease in a
production unit and thereby hold the entire lease. However, if
this situation continues indefinitely, the lessor should be entitled
to enforce the covenant implied in an oil and gas lease to reason-
ably develop the leased premises.'" In passing, there may be
overriding royalty and production payment interests in the lease
production and while it is recognized that such interests are
automatically subject to being pooled with the royalty by the
lessee, it is better practice to make specific provisions therefor in
the instrument creating such interests. Other problems of pooling
and unitization are outside the scope of this subject.3'
There is another problem arising out of the relationship between
the lessors and the lessees with respect to the sale of gas which I
have not hereinbefore mentioned, and that is the nature and
extent of the obligation of the lessee to market gas. While this
obligation is perhaps subject to being otherwise determined, the
courts and text writers of this country have considered this prob-
lem primarily under the rules and decisions dealing with implied
covenants. Professor Merrill, in defining the four implied obliga-
tions of the lessee under the ordinary oil and gas lease, lists as
his third implied covenant:
"III. The implied covenant for diligent and proper opera-
tion of the wells and for marketing the product, if oil or gas
is discovered in paying quantities." '
Although the implied covenant of the lessee to market production
receive on production from a unit so pooled only such portion of the royalty stipulated
herein as .the amount of his acreage placed in the unit or his royalty interest therein on
an acreage' basis hears to the total acreage so pooled in the particular unit involved.
30. See, generally Merrill, op. cit. supra note 25, c. III.
31. For a good discussion of some of the problems arising from pooling and utilization,
see Walker. Developments In The Law Of Oil And Gas In Texas During The War Years,
2.5 Tex. Law Rev. 1 (1946), and Jones, Non-Participating Royalty, 26 Tex. Law Rev.
569 (1948).
32. Merrill, op. cit. supra note 25, §4.
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under an oil and gas lease is well established, :  there has been no
exact definition of the duties and obligations imposed on the lessee
thereunder. Rather, it has been stated somewhat ambiguously that
the lessee has the duty to market oil and gas as and when a rea-
sonably prudent and diligent operator would do so under the same
similar circumstances. :" Thus, the duty to market is not an absolute
one, and the lessee is not required to produce and market at a loss, : ;
but is required to do whatever is reasonable under the circum-
stances.:"
A consideration of this marketing obligation necessarily in-
volves not only the question of the lessee's obligation to market
production but also whether the lessee is under a duty to prepare
or treat the gas to make it marketable, to transport it, to construct
facilities for utilization and marketing, and to account therefor.
As we consider these ancillary matters, it is important to keep
in mind the well recognized rule that the lessee's marketing obliga-
tion is measured at the well head, and in the absence of lease pro-
visions to the contrary, the payment of royalties on gas production
is to be computed on the basis of the market value at the well. 7
The duty of a lessee under this implied marketing covenant is
to be diligent in securing a market for the lease production, and
if this is clone, the lessee has complied with this covenant. How-
ever, several of the text writers have theoretically suggested that
the lessee is obligated, at his own expense, to do whatever may be
33. Kretni Development Co. v. Consolidated Oil Corp., 74 F.2d 497 (10th Cir.
1934); Molter v. Lewis, 156 Kan. 544, 134 P.2d 404 (1943); Mills and Willingham,
Law of Oil and Gas §130 (1926); 2 Summers, Oil and Gas §400 (1938); Walker, The
Nature of the Property Interests Created By an Oil and Gas Lease in Tcxas, 11 Tex.
Law Rev. 437 (1933), and many other authorities.
34. Newell v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 144 F.2d 338 (10th Cir. 1944); Armstrong v.
Skelly Oil Co., 55 F.2d 1066 (5th Cir. 1922); Molter v. Lewis, 156 Kan. 544, 134
P.2d 404 (1943); Rhoads Drilling Co. v. Allred, 70 S.W. 2d 576 (Tex. C.A. 1934);
2 Summers, Oil and Gas §J400, 416 (1938); Siefkinsupra note 10, at 183.
35. Merrill, op. cit. supra note 25, 190 and Pocket Supplement 38 (1950) and
authorities cited.
36. Wilfe v. Texas Co., 83 F.2d 425 (10th Cir. 1936), cert. denied 299 U.S. 553
(1936), and other authorities cited herein.
37. Sartor v. Arkansas Natural Gas Corp., 321 U.S. 620 (1944), rehearing denied
322 U.S. 767 (1944); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Ochsner, 146 F.2d 138 (5th Cir. 1944);
Arkansas Natural Gas Co. v. Sartor, 78 F.2d 924 (5th Cir. 1935); Kretni Development
Co. v. Consolidated Oil Corp., 74 F.2d 497 (10th Cir. 1934); Clear Creek Oil &
Gas Co. v. Bushmiaer, 165 Ark. 303, 264 S.W. 830 (1924); Molter v. Lewis, :156
Kan. 544, 134 P.2d 404 (1943); Scott v. Steinberger, 113 Kan. 67, 213 Pac. .646
(1923); Wall v. United Gas Public Service Co., 178 La. 908, 152 So. 561 (1934);
Katscher v. Eason Oil Co., 178 Oki. 634, 63 P.2d 977 (1937); 3 Summers, Oil and
Gas 1§589, 590 (1938); Mills and Willingham, Law of Oil & Gas §130 (1926);
Siefkin, supra note 10, at 199; Sneed, supra note 1, at 643; Walker, The Nature
of the Property Interests Created By an Oil and Gas Lease in Texas, 10 Tex. Law
Rev. 291, 310-11 (1932); Hardwicke, Problems Arising Out of Royalty Clauses in Oil &
Gas Leases 1655.
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necessary to render the gas marketable, :;, but the weight of author-
ity appears to support the proposition that, since value of the pro-
duction at the mouth of the well is determinative, the royalties
paid on production should not be computed upon transported or
processed values without deducting the lessor's proportionate part
of the transportation or processing expense.:'" In fact, even Professor
Merrill'" recognizes that the "transportation to a distant point is
no part of the legitimate operating expense of the lease," citing
Voshell v. Indian Territory Ill. Oil Co." Carrying this thought to its
logical conclusion, the point indicated by Professor Merrill, at
which he apparently would terminate the lessee's obligation to
bear the production and operating expenses of his lessor, can
logically be only at the mouth of the well. If this obligation is
otherwise construed and the lessee is held liable for the cost
of treating and processing the royalty of his lessor, there would
result in numerous present day production areas (as where there
is a gas-sulphur problem) a situation where the amount paid the
lessor as royalty would equal one-fifth or more of the net pro-
duction proceeds, and the interest of the lessee would be reduced
to less than that provided in the lease. This would be contrary
to the intention of the lessor and lessee in the execution* of the
lease. The parties can make a lease providing for one-fifth royalty
if they so desire, but the courts should not do it for them by
changing through the construction the specific terms of an existing
lease.
The construction of facilities for the utilization and marketing
of production is a matter which is becoming vitally important
in this country. Again, while several of the writers suggest that the
marketing obligation should require a lessee .to provide this con-
38. Merrill. op. cit. supra note 25, §85; Mills and Willingham, op. cit. supra note
26, §129; 3 Summers, Oil and Gas §590 (1938), each writer citing U.S. Tex. Oil Corp.
v. Kynerd, 296 Fed. 836 (5th Cir. 1924); Hamilton v. Empire Gas & Fuel Co., 117
Kan. 25, 230 Pac. 91 (1924); Warfield Natural Gas Co. v. Allen, 261 Ky. 840, 88
S.W.2d 989 (1935); Tremont Lumber Co. v. Louisiana Oil Ref. Corp., 187 La. 454,
175 So. 25 (1937); Clark v. Slick Oil Co., 88 Oki. 55, 211 Pac. 496 (1922). But see
Siefkin, supra note 10 at 192 for an excellent critical analysis of these authorities.
39. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Johnson, 155 F.2d 185 (5th Cir. 1946), cert. denied
329 U.S. 730 (1946); U.S. v. Stanolind Crude Oil Purchasing Co. 113 F.2d 194 (10th
Cir. 1940); Armstrong v. Skelly Oil Co., 55 F.2d 1066 (5th Cir. 1922); In re Roberts
Mining and Milling Co., 35 F. Supp. 678 (D. Nev. 1940); Western Gulf Oil Co. v.
Title Ins. & Trust Co., 92 Cal. A.2d 257, 206 P.2d 643 (1949); Vedder Petroleum
Corporation v. Lambert Lands Co., 74 Cal. A.2d 720, 169 P.2d 435 (1946); Coyle v.
Louisiana Gas & Fuel Co., 175 La. 990, 144 So. 737 (1932); Katscher v. Eason Oil Co.,
178 Okla. 634, 63 P.2d 977 (1937); Danciger Oil & Refineries v. Hamill Drilling Co.,
141 Tex. 153. 171 S.W.2d 321 (1943); Siefkin, supra note 10, at 197, and numerous
other' authorities. See also Cimarron Utilities Co. v. Safranko, 187 Okla. 86, 101 P.2d
258 (1940).
40. Merrill, op. cit. supra note 25, at 219.
41. 137 Kan. 160, 19 P.2d 456 (1933).
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struction at his own expense," this proposition is not supported
by the authorities. Professor Merrill has recognized this situation,
saying:
"The question has been mooted whether the lessee is under
an obligation to construct facilities to utilize the production
or to furnish an outlet therefor if none exists in the field. An
affirmative answer has been suggested by an able writer,
provided there is reasonable ground for anticipating profit
from the adventure. (Citing Walker, The Nature of the Prop-
erty Interests Created by an Oil and Gas Lease in Texas, 11
Tex. L. Rev. 399, 438 (1933). Cf. Reynolds v. McMan 0.
& G. Co., 11 S.W. (2nd) 778, 14 S.W. (2d) 819 (Tex. Com. A.
1929) where the court suggested 'where such question is not
voluntarily resolved by the lessee, doubtless it would be solved
upon the principles of reasonable diligence in discharging the
implied duty of conservation of oil.') The decisions thus far,
however, have not enforced any such duty. Thus they have
declined to require the lessee to build a pipe line, (Citing Kret-
ni Development Co. v. Consolidated Oil Corp., 74 F. (2d) 497
(C.C.A. 10th, 1934) (cert. den. 295 U. S. 750, 79 L. Ed. 1694,
55 S. Ct. 829 (1935)); Keenan v. Texas Prod. Co., (C.C.A.
10th, 1936) 84 F. (2d) 826) or a refinery (citing Keenan v.
Texas Prod. Co. (C.C.A. 10th, 1936) 84 F. (2d) 826) or a
plant for the extraction of casinghead gasoline. (citing Arm-
strong v. Skelly Oil Co. (no. 2) (C.C.A. 5th, 1932) 55 F.
(2d) 1066; Crichton v. Standard Oil Co., (La. 1933) 150 S.
668 )-.43
In Danciger Oil & Refineries v. Hamill Drilling Co.,44 wherein
the court was considering the provisions of an oil and gas mining
contract, Chief Justice Alexander said:
"Hamill contends that since it was provided in the contract
that the gas was to be paid for at the 'prevailing market prices
paid by the major companies in the Gulf Coast area,' and
since the parties knew at the time the contract was made that
there was no market in that vicinity for gas such as was being
produced from the lease, we should hold, in the light of these
"surrounding circumstances,' that the parties contemplated that
Danciger should, at his own expense, manufacture the gas into
some product that would be marketable in that vicinity. We
are not in accord with this view. It is not infrequent that con-
tracts of this kind are entered into in new fields before a market
has been established for the products named. They are entered
into in contemplation that a market will be created when the
42. Hardwicke. Evolution of Cauinghead Gas Law. 8 Tex. Law Rev. 1, 29 (1929)
(although Mr. Hardwicke states " . . It is not believed that such'is the law.". Walker,
The Nature of Property Interests Created byp an Oil and Gas Lease in Texas, 11 Tex.
Law Rev. 399. 439 (1933); Merrill, op. cit. supra note 25, at 221.
43. Merrill, op. cit. supra note 25, at 221.
44. 141 Tex. 153, 171 S.W.2d 321 (1943).
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supply of goods justifies it. The mere fact that there was then
no market in that vicinity for the product then being produced
from the lease, is not alone sufficient to justify us in overturning
the plain, certain, and unambiguous terms of the contract. In
order for us to sustain Hamill's contention it would be necessary
for us to write into the contract terms that are not only not em-
bodied therein, but that would be contrary to and in conflict
with the terms used therein. Hamill's contention is this respect
is overruled."
Other decisions not cited in the foregoing quotation from Mer-
rill. which support the view that normally there is no obligation
upon the lessee to construct or erect marketing facilities, are Free-
man v. Magnolia Petroleum Company4' and Risinger v. Arkansas-
Louisiana Gas Company."; Due to the required financial invest-
ment and the other complicated economic and market factors
affecting the enforcement of such an obligation, one writer has
suggested that "problem as of today comes perilously close to be-
ing academic."r In any event, it is submitted that if the lessee in
good faith diligently endeavors to secure a market, he has com-
plied with the duty which the lessor and lessee contemplated in the
inception of the lease.
Professor Merrill has suggested that as a part of the marketing
covenant, "there is an obligation to measure the production accur-
ately and to account with fidelity."" Certainly this obligation
should exist under any theory of the law and be enforceable with-
out regard to a covenant implied in an oil and gas lease.
An important part of any consideration of this marketing cove-
nant, and the rights of the lessor and lessee with respect to "The
sale of gas, is the manner of enforcement of such rights and
covenant. My time permits me only to indicate here
certain suggested procedures. Ordinarily, the remedy for the breach
of the marketing covenant is by an action on the lease contract
to recover damages,4" and the measure of such damages may be
the lost royalty which would have been realized if the lessee had
complied with the covenant. " However, the failure to comply with
45. 165 S.W.2d 111 (Tex. C. A. 1942) (reversed on other grounds, 171 S.W.2d
339 (1943)).
46. 198 La. 101, 3 S.2d 289 (1941); But see Libby v. DeBaca, 51 N.M. 95, 179
P.2d 263 (1947), wherein the lessee was held to be under a duty to erect a plant to
manufacture "dry ice" from carbon dioxide gas, there being no purchaser available.
Cf. Chapman v. Texas Co., 80 F. Supp. 15 (E. D. Ill. 1948); Kirke v. Texas Co., 186
F.2d 643 (7th Cir. 1951).
47. Siefkin, aupra note 10, at 209.
48. Merrill, op. cit. supra note 25, at 222.
49. Merrill, op. cit. supra note 25, 1148. See also Walker, supra note 42; Siefkin, supra
note 10, at 181.
50. Merrill, op. cit. supra note 25, 5155.
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the express or implied terms of the lease may also represent a
violation of the tort duty to exercise due care,"' or as has been stated,
the violation of a duty created by contract. Therefore, since it ap-
pears that under a given fact situation, the lessor may have an op-
tion with respect to whether his° action shall sound in tort or con-
tract, it is important to consider the applicable principles of tort
and contract law before any such action is instituted.-
In conclusion, we have seen a tremendous expansion of the gas
industry during the last 15 years, and by reason thereof, many new
and complex problems have arisen which have and will hereafter in-
fluence the negotiation and preparation of contracts affecting gas
production. The lawyer of today not only must draw a contract which
will be economically satisfactory to his client but also must con-
sider the effect of Anti Trust and Federal Power Commission reg-
ulations and restrictions on the resulting contractual relationship. :.
In this respect, our law is not static but is as fluid as the times. We
can only wait and see what tomorrow may bring.
51. Walker, supra note 42, at 441, and numerous other reported authorities. See
also Siefkin, supra note 10, at 181.
52. Walker, supra note 42, at 441. In this articel, Professor Walker points out
that by the use of contract remedies, measure of damages, and statutes of limitation, the
relation of the parties may be materially affected. See also Brown, Implied Covenant to
Use Due Care, 19 Tex. Law Rev. 80. 82 (1940).
53. A recent Federal decision involving Federal Power Commission jurisdiction could
have a lasting effect on the gas industry in this couptry. State of Wisconsin v. Federal
Power Commission (Phillips Petroleum Co., Intervenor), 205 F.2d 706 (D.C. Cir. 1953).
